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Abstract: 
The article explains the peculiarities of institutional effects on growth rates in post-
communist countries. By proposing a certain dependence of the institution-growth nexus on 
the nature of institutional emergence, the distinction between revolutionary and evolutionary 
processes of institution formation is introduced. Theoretical and empirical juxtapositions are 
used to demonstrate that transition countries’ institutions that are constructed revolutionarily 
differ from those that emerge evolutionarily in a twofold manner in their relationship to 
growth. Growth rates of their economies are less likely to depend on the quality of economic 
institutions and are more likely to be a function of the maturity of political institutions. In 
addition, economic institutions in post-communist countries prove to be a product of the 
quality of political bodies to a greater extent than their evolutionary alternatives.  
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When formal institutions fail in fostering economic growth: the case of 
post-communist countries   
 
1. Introduction  
The collapse of socialism led to multifaceted and profound changes in the political, 
economic, and social systems of post-socialist countries. Formal institutions were expected to 
mold these changes into a legal framework and define new rules according to which the 
economy and society were supposed to operate. The introduction of free market formal 
institutions did not lead, however, to the expected outcomes in most transition economies. 
The well-functioning institutions of capitalism, which according to growth theory are the 
foundation of economic development (Assane and Grammy, 2003; Beck and Laeven, 2006; 
Lane and Rohner, 2004; Siddiqui and Masood, 2009), proved rather dysfunctional in post-
communist conditions (Lenchuk, 2008; Polterovich, 2005, 2008; Radygin and Entov, 2008). 
The relationship between the quality of formal institutions and rates of growth in transition 
economies was recognized as peculiar, differing from the pattern usually found in developed 
and/or developing countries. 
The main objective of this study is to demonstrate that the revolutionary approach which led 
to the formation of key economic institutions could be the main reason for the relative 
dysfunctionality and inefficiency of formal institutions in ensuring rapid and sustainable 
economic growth in post-communist countries. The rationale behind our argument is that 
revolutionary institutional formation occurred independently from the culture prevalent 
among economic agents, as well as trends in economic structural transformations, resulting in 
institutions incompatible with prevalent informal norms and features of local economic 
systems. 
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2. Literature overview 
Growth theory asserts that good formal institutions are conducive to rapid economic 
development. Empirical evidence from economically developed and/or developing countries 
(Eicher and Leukert, 2009) largely supports this statement (Assane and Grammy, 2003; 
Baum and Lake, 2003; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 2003; Tavares 
and Wacziarg, 2001) with regard to both political (Chen and Feng, 1996; Klomp and de 
Haan, 2009; Narayan et al., 2011) and economic institutions (Rodrik et al., 2002). The post-
communist countries are rarely included in this analysis because they represent a particularly 
unusual group (Bosworth and Collins, 2003).   
Transition economies are nonetheless addressed independently by research that is usually 
consistent with conventional findings about the positive effects of institutions on growth rates 
(Beck and Laeven, 2006; Berglof, 2008; Crafts and Kaiser, 2004; Dreher et al., 2007; Eicher 
and Schreiber, 2010; Redek and Susjan, 2005; Sachs, 2001). However, the majority of these 
studies utilize a very narrow definition of institutions which results in limiting their 
operationalization to either political quality, such as democracy (Grogan and Moers, 2001), 
or levels of economic freedom, such as liberalization (Falcetti et al., 2006). Formal 
institutions designed to regulate an economic agent’s decision-making, such as property 
rights or contract enforcement legislation, remain largely beyond the scope of analysis.  
The gap is filled by Eastern European scholars who usually come to the opposite conclusion. 
Contrary to the conventional belief, they assert that the existence of formal economic 
institutions per se rarely leads to economic prosperity in the former socialist economies (Mau, 
2007; Petrunya and Ivashina, 2010; Polischuk, 2008; Polterovich, 2008) since they often lack 
compatibility with post-communist economic systems (Lenchuk, 2008; Polterovich, 2005; 
Polterovich and Popov, 2006) or prevalent informal norms (Kantzurov, 2011; Yasin, 2003). 
In addition, the lack of strong political contexts is believed to restrain these countries from 
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further improving their formal institutions, and as a result, institutional reforms usually end 
up promoting only the redistribution of economic or political power without entraining any 
substantial change in economic growth (Dementiev and Vishnevskiy, 2011). As a 
consequence, many transition economies appear to be locked in an institutional trap 
(Polterovich, 2005), with any improvement in institutions being associated only with 
considerable economic and social losses (Polterovich, 2008).  
The Eastern European approach to interpreting the relationship between formal institutions 
and growth as negative is, nonetheless, rarely tested in conjunction with other countries. 
There appear to be no empirical studies that directly juxtapose institutional effects in 
transition economies and developed and/or developing countries. An indirect comparison of 
results is, by contrast, hardly possible since studies do not use a standard set of conditioning 
variables and standard periods which would ensure comparability of findings.  
In general, growth theory recognizes the existence of heterogeneity in the effects of formal 
institutions. It is well-established that the direction and strength of institutional effects on 
growth may vary depending on the level of maturity of formal institutions (Barro, 1997; 
Fidrmuc and Tichit 2007, Przeworski and Limongi, 1993) or a country’s level of economic 
prosperity (Basu, 2008; Eicher and Leukert, 2009; Lee and Kim, 2009). We would question, 
however, the idea that the two explanations are exhaustive for the post-communist countries. 
They started their institutional reforms from a relatively similar platform in terms of the level 
of their economic development and the type and degree of institutional maturity, but ended 
up at very different levels of success. Instead, we argue that the cross-country variation of 
institutional effects on economic growth can also be attributed to the way in which such 
institutions were formed. The peculiar relationship of economic institutions to growth rates in 
transition economies can be explained by the revolutionary nature of their institution building 
and socio-economic forces resulting from this process. 
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The latter proposition requires that a theoretical model should be constructed to juxtapose the 
post-communist pattern of institution building with that prevalent in other countries to 
identify possible implications that this type of institutional formation may have for a 
country’s growth dynamics.  
 
3. Theoretical model  
Institutional theory distinguishes between two major means of institutional formation:  
evolutionary and revolutionary (Matthews, 1995; North, 1990; Poznanski, 1995). We use 
Portes’s sociological model of institution building (2006) for this distinction. According to 
this conceptual framework, institutional grafting is subject to the influence of a dual set of 
forces. On the one hand, there is culture which consists of moral values and norms that in 
turn manifest themselves in certain role expectations regarding the conduct of economic 
agents or representatives of authority. On the other hand, there is social structure that includes 
power and elites (who control that power) who are embedded within a certain class structure 
with a clearly specified status hierarchy. The theory asserts that, institutions, regardless of the 
means of their formation, are expected to be compatible with both culture and social structure 
in order for institutional creation to be successful. If institutions are deliberately created and 
hence stem from culture, dominant classes and political elites need to be persuaded or 
compelled to legalize them. If imposed by political elites, institutional change must 
presuppose an alteration of the underlying values, which can enable their acceptance by 
culture.   
We expand this approach by arguing that successful institutional formation or transformation 
is embedded within a three-dimensional structure which, if not complied with, may 
potentially create three forces of opposition to institutional change. The first dimension is 
derived from culture (Portes, 2006) and is called “values structure.” It includes prevalent 
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moral values/norms that dictate right and wrong, as well as moral behavior describing how 
likely it is that an individual’s conduct deviates from their good morals. The second 
dimension is social structure, in which we follow Portes (2006) and distinguish between 
political elites who deal with formalizing institutions, and class structure that predefines the 
potential level of deliberate resistance to institutional change on the part of the population. 
The third dimension is economic structure which describes the rationale behind, and nature 
of, economic arrangements and economic infrastructure in a country. It predefines the extent 
to which a country’s economic system and economic processes embedded within the system 
are in tune with the logic of formal institutions. Institutional formation processes are therefore 
expected to be successful if there is sufficient compatibility between them and the three 
dimensions described above: moral structure, social structure, and economic structure. An 
illustration of this logic is presented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 here 
If analyzed within this theoretical framework, the logic of the evolutionary approach can be 
described as in Figure 2. As economic agents operate, they accumulate knowledge and 
experiences which lead to changes in technologies and further promote the division of labor 
(Davis, 2010). This changes the organization of production processes in a country and, hence, 
leads to alterations in economic structures.  
Profound change in the economic domain leads to alterations in the way economic agents 
think, as well as their values structure. The existing formal institutions become no longer 
adequate and commensurate with both economic structures (i.e. prevalent technologies, 
economic process) and the preferences of economic agents, thereby raising market 
transaction costs (North, 1990). Contractual arrangements begin to create demand for 
institutional change that can lower the transaction costs of exploiting new opportunities 
(Pejovich, 1999).  
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Figure 2 here 
In trying to bypass the existent inconsistencies, economic agents start introducing informal 
changes (Eggertsson, 1997) in formal “rules of the game,” thereby making the institutional 
framework more flexible. If efficient and compatible with the interests of political elites 
(Portes, 2006), these changes are captured by the political system which takes on the function 
of formalizing and legalizing them, as a result of which they acquire the status of formal 
institutions. A clear-cut example of the evolutionary institutional formation is the institutional 
evolution of early modern Europe. 
The logic of institutional evolution hence entails the following: First, the formation process is 
initiated by economic agents and, therefore, new institutions are highly likely to be consistent 
with their values structure. Second, formal institutions are fully compatible with the 
economic structures in force, since any change in old institutions largely occurs as a reaction 
to changes in economic systems or technologies. Third, the role of political elites in 
institution creation is relatively inferior and restricted to a formalization of institutions that 
previously emerged at the micro-level. The flexibility of political bodies, however, 
predetermines how rapidly new institutions that meet such demand are adopted (Davis, 
2010).   
The distinct feature of the revolutionary approach to institutional formation shared by post-
communist economies is that change in their political systems triggered and enforced by 
political elites preceded change in their economic systems (Fidrmuc, 2003). Such radical 
political alterations necessitate an adjustment of institutional framework to the new political 
logic and hence promote an immediate introduction of an entirely new set of economic 
institutions, commensurate with the logic of new political principles (see Figure 3). Usually, 
such reforms do not require broad support by the population, while the resistance of middle 
and lower classes is blocked. The economic crisis caused by shortcomings and imperfections 
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of the previous regime serves as a justification for the introduction of essential changes in 
both political and economic systems. The lack of internalized tradition to organize 
themselves into a collective resistance and control of the army by the political elite may also 
contribute to suppressing resistance of the population to profound reforms.  
Figure 3 here 
In any case, the support of a country’s institutional reforms by the population does not 
predetermine the success of such reforms since political elites and public and private actors 
usually have limited knowledge of how the new economic system should function. Because 
of this, the process of building new formal institutions is largely limited to borrowing 
institutions from countries with similar political rules and implanting them into the specific 
local context. The formal rules are therefore imposed from without (Pejovich, 1999), which is 
believed to lead to the emergence of two kinds of problems.  
On the one hand, the implantation of foreign institutions into the specific local context often 
lacks an appropriate analysis of their compatibility with characteristics of local economic 
structures. When copying Western industrial legislation designed for postindustrial societies 
with a prevalence of medium and small businesses, many CIS governments did not, for 
instance, take into account that their economies are still characterized by the 
overrepresentation of large enterprises (Polterovich and Popov, 2006), which made new rules 
a priori suboptimal for the existing economic systems. Reforms aimed at enforcing changes 
in economic structures and hence narrowing the differences between the recipient- and 
source-countries of formal institutions become necessary, but in practice are often left to 
random forces with institutional change expected to generate the required structural change 
(Eggertsson, 1997).  
On the other hand, a similar inconsistency is also believed to emerge between new formal 
institutions and values structures (Kyriazis and Zouboulakis, 2005; Portes, 2006; Prado and 
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Trebilcock, 2009) since transition countries are highly likely to possess their own mentality, 
behavioral patterns, and business cultures (Balabanova, 2002; Matveenko, 2005). As a 
consequence, their economic agents often perceive and interpret the newly imported formal 
institutions in a way that is absolutely different from their initial context, which results in a 
mutation of such institutions (Vernikov, 2009) or low levels of their enforcement.  
The learning experience is expected to minimize or fully eliminate both kinds of 
inconsistencies (Nelson and Sampat, 2001). If policymakers design and introduce adjustment 
policies for the orderly operation of the system at each stage during the transition period, the 
inconsistency between new formal institutions and economic structures is believed to be 
narrowed gradually. Similarly, if economic actors learn that acting according to new formal 
institutions can expand their opportunity set, they may change their moral values and moral 
behavior. The existence of learning processes imply, however, that there will be lengthy lags 
between the initiation of fundamental institutional change and the time when the relevant 
actors get the structures right (Eggertsson, 1997).  
Overall, one ascribes the following features to the revolutionary method of institution 
formation: First, the formation of institutions is initiated by political elites and hence it is 
highly likely that these institutions will be incompatible with values structures in force, at 
least at the initial stage of institutional reforms. Second, inconsistencies may also appear 
between formal institutions and the current economic structures. Third, the role of political 
elites is superior and cannot be confined to legalizing new institutions, but extends itself to 
their selection, design, introduction, and subsequent adjustment to values and economic 
structures in place.  
The driving forces of institutional change and the extent to which the entire institutional 
framework is subjected to change in the short-run, therefore, constitute the main criteria for 
distinguishing between evolutionary and revolutionary means of institution formation. In the 
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case of the evolutionary pattern, change in technologies and economic processes necessitates 
institutional reforms which usually embrace only a few institutional elements in the existing 
institutional framework. By contrast, the revolutionary institutional reforms are triggered by 
changes in the political domain and usually include reforming the entire set of institutions in 
the existing institutional framework. 
It is also possible that institutional evolution borrows methods of the revolutionary approach, 
in which policymakers intervene in the formation of institutions directly, by introducing rules 
of the game foreign to the system. Such changes can however concern only a few institutional 
elements so that the total institutional change is relatively small and cannot cause the 
emergence of inconsistencies between institutions, moral codes, and economic structures. 
The opening of previously closed professions in Greece, which required only certain 
adjustments in the competition law, is a good illustration of this case. Profound institutional 
change can also happen, but it remains gradual and incremental in nature, with substantial 
alterations in formal institutions or in the entire institutional framework occurring relatively 
slowly (Efendic et al., 2011), giving enough time for values and economic structures to co-
evolve with institutions and adjust themselves to new rules. 
In sum, institutional change is an evolutionary one when new institutions emerge as a result 
of interactions between values and economic structures. If institutional transformations are 
imposed by political elites, the pattern remains evolutionary in nature so long as only a few 
institutional elements are subjected to radical or substantial alterations, and the logic of the 
whole institutional framework is retained unchanged. The pattern turns into a revolutionary 
one if alterations are imposed by political elites and extended to a simultaneous 
transformation of all elements of the institutional framework. The transition from socialism to 
capitalism experienced by post-communist countries should be considered a good example 
for the revolutionary process of institution building. 
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Understanding the main differences between evolutionary and revolutionary patterns of 
institutional formation allows us to formulate four propositions for growth theory.  
Proposition 1: Economic institutions that emerged in a revolutionary way might be less 
effective for economic development than those formed by alternative means, since they are 
less compatible with features of local economic structures and cultures at least in the short 
run.  
Proposition 2: Since fundamental institutional change involves a learning process for both 
political elites and economic agents, there will be lengthy lags between the initiation of 
fundamental institutional change and the time when the right institutional frameworks 
emerge. Political elites need some time to experiment and learn how to design and operate 
new formal institutions. Economic agents in turn need to learn how to act according to the 
new rules. Common sense also suggests that learning processes might be non-linear and 
hence as institutional elements approach optimal design, they must induce a better learning 
process.  
Proposition 3: Since the revolutionary means of institution formation presupposes radical 
change in the set of institutions, economic development becomes a function of the ability of 
political elites to ensure a smooth transition to new institutions, and if necessary, to introduce 
measures aimed at tailoring and adjusting economic structures and/or values structures to the 
new rules of the game. By contrast, the evolutionary pathway is mainly characterized by the 
introduction of insignificant cumulative changes into existing institutions which seldom 
require such adaptation measures or coordinating actions on the part of the government.  
Proposition 4: Since the revolutionary pathway is based on a greater involvement of political 
elites in the process of institution formation and includes the process of learning to a greater 
degree, the quality of such formal institutions largely becomes a function of the experience 
and skillfulness of politicians in dealing with institution design and introduction. Their ability 
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to minimize the difference between current features of economic structures, cultures, and 
newly introduced institutions predetermines the extent to which institution creating processes 
are successful and newly imported economic institutions survive and function effectively. 
Based on these propositions, we deduce five hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: The impact of economic institutions on economic growth is greater when such 
institutions are formed by the evolutionary pathway, rather than via revolutionary change.  
Hypothesis 2: The impact of an improvement in institutional quality is associated with (a) 
lagged and (b) non-linear improvements in rates of economic growth in post-communist 
countries. 
Hypothesis 3: The impact of national political systems’ quality on rates of economic growth 
is greater when institutional formation occurs through the revolutionary method rather than 
through the evolutionary pathway. 
Hypothesis 4: The impact of national political systems’ quality on the effectiveness of 
economic institutions is greater when the formation of such institutions happens in the 
revolutionary way than in the evolutionary. 
Hypothesis 5: Countries which manage to minimize incompatibilities between new market 
economy institutions on the one hand, and their moral and economic structures on the other 
hand, are associated with greater improvements in their economic institutions.  
 
4. Data and method description  
To test these hypotheses, we use Eicher’s and Leukert’s (2009) approach of splitting the 
sample into subsamples and conducting an empirical analysis for each of them separately. 
The revolutionary subsample consists of 26 countries that experienced socialism, and the vast 
majority of whom made an overnight transition to a market economy: Albania, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, 
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Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The 
size of their subsample is predetermined by data availability.  
The subsample representing the “evolutionary” group includes the 15 oldest members of the 
EU, as well as Australia, Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United States. 
In order to eliminate the possibility that the maturity level of institutions influences their 
relationship with economic performance, we included several developing countries that did 
not experience any radical change in their political and economic systems recently, and can 
therefore be included in the evolutionary subsample: Brazil, Chile, Malaysia, Paraguay, 
Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and Uruguay. In order to eliminate any possibility that 
the difference in the size of subsamples may lead to differences in coefficients or their 
significance tests, we have kept the sample of evolutionary economies relatively small, as 
well. 
In line with Pääkkönen’s study (2010), we use yearly data for the period from 1996 to 2007. 
We exclude the first years of transition from the analysis since the outset of transition 
entailed profound systemic changes (Fidrmuc, 2003; Lysenko, 2002) or a deep economic 
recession. We are also aware that during the chosen period, many former socialist economies 
gained accession into the EU, which may potentially bias the results by causing structural 
breaks. But, since we focus on studying precisely the effects of such improvements on growth 
rates and not the causes for these rapid changes, we would defend the plausibility of choosing 
data for the specified period. The total observations for both samples number 672, with the 
evolutionary sample containing 360 observations and the revolutionary one having 312 
observations.  
To test our hypotheses empirically, we use the dynamic GMM method proposed by Arellano 
and Bond (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) and applied by Bond et al. 
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(2001) to the growth equation. The procedure for applying this technique is well-documented 
in Pääkkönen (2010), Lee and Kim (2009), and Eicher and Schreiber (2010). It requires that 
the equation is first-differenced to eliminate the heterogeneity in production functions, and 
then an instrumental variable method is applied on the differenced model, with lagged values 
of the endogenous variables used as instruments for the variables themselves. This is possible 
in a panel setting since lags of the regressors are orthogonal to the error term and can serve as 
valid instruments (Lim and Decker, 2007). To avoid an overfitting bias, we restrict 
instruments only to the first, second, and third lags of the respective variables since they 
usually correlate most closely to the major explanatory variables (Pääkkönen, 2010). To 
demonstrate the correctness of the model, we report the results from a Sargan (Hansen J) 
overidentification test and the Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) serial correlation in the residuals.  
We apply the same model to both samples while ensuring that a standard set of conditioning 
variables and standard periods are used. To build the baseline model, we use Cobb-Douglas 
production function (Romer, 2006). Two conventional determinants are included in the 
model: physical capital (K) and effective labour (AL):  
Y(t) = K(t)
α
[A(t)L(t)]
1 – α 
 
Taking logs of both sides of this equation gives us: 
lnY(t) = αlnK(t) + (1 – α ) ln[A(t)L(t)]  
We augment the conventional model by including other determinants of growth: 
macroeconomic policy (MS), participation in international markets (IM) and economic 
institutions (EI). The growth equation to be estimated takes the following form:  
lnYit =αlnYit-1 + β1ln Kit + β2ln[A(t)L(t)] it + β3MSit + β4lnIMit + β5EIit + εit 
 To estimate the relationship between political institutions (PI) and growth, the following 
model is proposed: 
lnYit =αlnYit-1 + β1ln Kit + β2ln[A(t)L(t)] it + β3MSit + β4lnIMit + β5PIit + εit 
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The model for testing the impact of the quality of political elites and their decisions on the 
institution formation process can be presented as follows:  
EI it=αEI it-1+ ρ1URBANIZATIONit+ρ2SAVINGSit+ρ3GOVSit + ρ4PIit-1 +μit 
Where Yit is economic growth measured through an annual GDP growth rate, Yit-1 is one-
period-lagged economic growth. K operationalizes the investment in physical capital 
measured through gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP. MS represents 
macroeconomic stability captured by annual consumer price inflation. IM measures the 
openness of an economy through the percentage of countries’ export in GDP. [AL] is the 
effective labour operationalized through enrollment ratios in tertiary education.  
URBANIZATION stands for the level of urbanization expressed through the percentage of the 
population living in cities. SAVINGS refers to the percentage of GDP in the form of savings. 
GOVS represents the government size expressed as government expenses for operating 
activities in providing goods and services and measured as a percentage of GDP. The main 
source for all the variables is the World Bank electronic database.  
EI measures the quality of economic institutions and includes the following institutional 
indexes: impartial courts, protection of property rights, and legal enforcement of contracts. 
Their values vary from 1 (poorly defined economic institutions) to 10 (well-defined economic 
institutions). The information on all economic institutions is sourced from various issues of 
the Economic Freedom of the World. Some institutional indexes are not available for the 
entire period and hence the size of the subsamples varies depending on the scope of the 
analysis. We use a corruption perceptions index constructed by Transparency International to 
measure the level of enforcement of economic institutions. The values of the index vary from 
1 (complete corruption) to 10 (no corruption).  
PI measures the quality of political institutions or political environment including control of 
corruption in government, government effectiveness, quality of regulation, voice and 
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accountability, and political stability. All political indexes are variables ranging from -2.5 
(bad political situation) to 2.5 (ideal political situation). As in the case of economic 
institutional indexes, they are all constructed on the basis of yearly surveys. The main source 
for the data is the World Bank Group database.  
To gauge the effects of government policies aimed at adjusting national cultures and 
economic structures to new market economy institutions, we run an OLS regression based on 
the sample of 26 transition economies. The main objective of the regression is to estimate 
how the improvements in economic institutions which occurred over the period analyzed are 
associated with the success of political elites (policymakers) in changing the quality of values 
and economic structures, which is captured by the quality of the respective dimensions at the 
end of the analyzed period: 
EI_CHANGEi = ζ0 + ζ1EI1996i + ζ2MORAL_STRUCTURE2007i + 
ζ3ECON_STRUCTURE2007i + εi 
Where EI_CHANGE stands for a percentage change occurring in each of the selected 
economic institutions over the period analyzed and calculated as [(Economic Institution index 
in year 2007- Economic Institution index in year 1996)/ Economic Institution index in year 
1996]. EI1996 is the initial value of economic institutional index (in the year 1996). 
MORAL_STRUCTURE2007 describes the quality of culture in a country prevalent in the year 
2007 and reflects the success of the government in altering the underlying moral values 
during the period analyzed. It is operationalized through the index of ethical behavior of 
firms, which is based on a question in which respondents need to estimate whether the 
corporate ethics (ethical behavior in interactions with public officials, politicians, and other 
enterprises) “in your country are among the worst or the best in the world”. The responses 
vary from one to seven, with higher values corresponding to better ethics.  
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ECON_STRUCTURE2007 stands for the quality of economic structures in the year 2007 (end 
of the analyzed period) and reflects a government’s success in adjusting a country’s 
economic structures to the standards of a free market economy. It is measured through an 
index of bank soundness, an index of financial market sophistication, and an index of 
production process sophistication. The index of bank soundness is operationalized through a 
survey question in which companies need to estimate whether banks in their country are 
insolvent and may require a government bailout or are generally healthy with sound balance 
sheets. The index of financial market sophistication is operationalized through a survey 
question in which companies assess the level of sophistication of financial markets in their 
countries: whether they are poor or excellent by international standards. The index of 
production process sophistication is operationalized through a survey question asking 
companies to estimate whether production processes in their countries use labor-intensive 
methods/previous generations of process technology or the world’s best and most efficient 
process technology. The responses for all three questions are based on a seven-point scale, 
with higher values corresponding to a better situation in the banking sector, financial markets, 
or production processes, respectively. The main source for culture-related and economic 
structure-related measurements is the Global Competitiveness Report 2008 (World Economic 
Forum).  
 
5. Empirical results 
The empirical results largely support our expectations, suggesting that the relationship 
between economic institutions and economic growth acquires some specific characteristics in 
conditions of transition. Protection of property rights, impartiality of court decisions, or 
efficient enforcement of contracts by the state are all found to strongly affect growth rates of 
economies operating within the institutions formed through the evolutionary method (see 
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Table 1). By contrast, economic performance of countries in the revolutionary sample tends 
to show no positive association with the majority of the aforementioned formal institutions in 
the short run, which is in line with Hypothesis 1. The only exception is the index of 
impartiality of court decisions which positively relates to growth rates of transitional 
economies.  
Economic institutions of post-communist countries may develop some relationship with rates 
of economic growth in the long run, however. If relating lagged values of the property rights 
index and corruption perceptions index to growth rates (Table 2, Model 1 and 2), one finds a 
positive association in the case of the corruption perceptions index. This can be regarded as a 
partial support for Hypothesis 2(a).  
Table 1 here 
The short-term relationship between economic institutions and growth rates of transition 
economies proves, however, less straightforward. A closer analysis of institutional effects on 
economic performance when such institutions are formed revolutionarily suggests that this 
impact is often non-linear, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2(b). An improvement in the 
protection of property rights, for instance, affects growth rates negatively (see Table 2, Model 
3), especially if they are still at an early stage of their development and are of poor quality. 
Nonetheless, as the protection of property rights improves, the negative effect tends to 
gradually fade out (the quadratic term is positive). 
The non-linear relationship between economic institutions and rates of economic growth 
found in countries where the formation of such economic institutions occurred revolutionarily 
indicates that economies may grow even if formal institutions are poorly developed. 
Accounting for the level of institutional enforcement may contribute to clarifying these 
unusual results. The negative sign on the corruption variable (Table 1, Model 4) suggests that 
the poor enforcement of formal institutions might be a positive determinant of a country’s 
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economic performance. Controlling for the quality of formal institutions (protection of 
property rights) and the level of their enforcement (the corruption perceptions index) 
simultaneously (Table 2, model 4), suggests that weak enforcement is likely to offset the 
negative effect of formal institutions of low quality. By allowing an interaction between the 
property rights variable and corruption variable, we obtain more evidence for the smoothing 
effects of poor enforcement of unclear and confusing formal institutions on the dynamics of 
economic growth. Accordingly, improvements in enforcement levels of formal institutions 
without improving such institutions may impair economic development in transition countries 
(see Table 2, Model 5). But, if the enforcement mechanism is coupled with improving the 
quality of property rights, the main negative effect is offset and reducing corruption fosters 
economic development. 
Table 2 here 
Table 3 reports the effects of political settings on economic growth, which are largely 
consistent with the expectations formulated in Hypothesis 3. The results suggest that post-
communist economies operating within the institutional framework formed revolutionarily 
are more sensitive to the quality of their political bodies. Government effectiveness (Model 
3), regulatory quality (Model 4), and control of corruption in government (Model 5) develop 
a closer relationship with rates of economic growth when the formation of economic 
institutions follows a revolutionary pathway, but become relatively insignificant in promoting 
economic development when formal institutions evolve in an alternative way. For countries 
with the evolutionary method of institution building, it is more important to ensure the 
existence of strong democratic settings (the voice and accountability index) to allow their 
economies to grow. By contrast, countries relying on the revolutionary method of 
institutional formation might not necessarily develop a healthy democratic environment to 
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achieve good economic performance (Model 1), which is in line with Radygin’s and Entov’s 
findings (2008). They should rather focus on improving the quality of their policymaking.  
Table 3 here 
Table 4 furnishes evidence supporting Hypothesis 4, thereby suggesting that the quality of the 
political environment is of the utmost importance to the quality of institutions when such 
institutions are built in a revolutionary way. Economic institutions are particularly sensitive 
to the level of corruption in government and the quality of political decision-making 
(regulatory quality and government effectiveness). Since political elites are intensively 
involved in institutional formation processes when building institutions through the 
revolutionary method, it is highly likely that the quality of policymakers will predetermine 
the quality of new formal institutions. By contrast, countries which rely largely on the 
evolutionary method of institutional formation become more dependent on the quality of the 
overall political system (the voice and accountability index). 
Table 4 here 
Since the main danger of the revolutionary institutional formation is that the 
imposition of new institutions from outside onto post-communist specific contexts may create 
friction between such institutions and the local economic structures and cultures, the quality 
of political elites can be reduced to whether they introduce policies aimed at minimizing 
these inconsistencies. Table 5 contains results suggesting that countries which possessed 
better banking or financial systems and whose companies are characterized by more ethical 
behavior are associated with better improvements in the quality of economic institutions. This 
means that governments which invested their efforts in reforming values and economic 
structures in parallel to enforcing institutional change are more likely to be successful in 
building a sound institutional framework, which is consistent with Hypothesis 5. 
Table 5 here 
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The empirical analysis supports the original hypotheses. Moreover, the results can be 
considered robust, given variations in sample size and measurement approaches to economic 
and political institutions. The size of the samples changes considerably across empirical 
models used in the analysis without, however, entraining substantial alterations in the 
relationships of interest. In addition, four indexes for economic institutions and five indexes 
for the quality of political bodies used in the analysis can be considered alternative measures 
of the respective constructs which operationalize overlapping, albeit slightly different, 
dimensions of the institutional framework. They all prove, however, the development of a 
very similar relationship to economic performance.  
 
6. Conclusion and discussion  
This study therefore confirms the idea that the impact of economic institutions on economic 
growth may vary depending on the way in which such institutions emerge. If countries build 
their institutions in a revolutionary method, the relationship of formal institutions to growth 
rates may acquire two specific features. On the one hand, economic institutions prove to have 
a deformed association with economic growth in the short run, owing to the inability of such 
countries to ensure the compatibility of newly-introduced institutions with their economic 
systems’ features and informal norms. On the other hand, the quality of their political systems 
and policymaking decisions is recognized to be of the utmost importance to the success of 
their institutional reforms. In general, it is possible to assert that governments’ ability to 
select and implant good formal institutions, while minimizing possible incompatibility 
between such institutions and the national economic environment into which they must fit, 
should be seen as the single most important factor of institutional reforms in transition 
economies. 
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Understanding the specificities of the revolutionary pathway to institutional formation allows 
us to identify the possible directions for effective institutional reforms in post-communist 
countries. We see these reforms as a two-step transformation process. The first is the 
implementation of radical reforms in their political systems aimed at minimizing corruption 
in the government and public services, improving professionalism and qualification of 
government members, and guaranteeing political stability. This can create the conditions 
necessary for rapid economic development in the short run and lay the necessary foundation 
for radical institutional change. The second includes the introduction of such institutional 
change, which should occur in combination with reforms in values and economic structures. 
The latter combination may reduce the probability of the emergence of inconsistencies 
between characteristics of new rules of “the game” and the environment in which this game 
takes place, thereby leading to better economic performance in a country.  
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Figure 2. Logic of the evolutionary pathway to institutional formation and change  
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Figure 3. Logic of the revolutionary pathway to institutional formation and change  
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Table 1.  
The impact of institutional indexes on economic growth, by type of institutional formation 
Variable 
Evolutionary  
way of institutional formation 
  Revolutionary  
way of institutional formation 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Impartial courts  
 
0.338*** 
(4.36) 
   0.039* 
(1.87) 
   
Protection of property rights   0.438*** 
(6.19) 
   -0.009 
(-0.53) 
  
Legal enforcement of contracts   0.380* 
(1.74) 
   0.228 
(1.26) 
 
Corruption perceptions index    0.129 
(1.16) 
   -0.072*** 
(-2.62) 
lnYt-1 0.201*** 
(5.42) 
0.345*** 
(5.90) 
-0.213 
(-1.44) 
0.331*** 
(8.74) 
-0.122* 
(-1.92) 
-0.317*** 
(-5.86) 
-0.479** 
(-2.14) 
-0.275*** 
(-5.02) 
lnK 1.344** 
(2.53) 
-0.279 
(-0.34) 
1.054** 
(1.98) 
3.699*** 
(9.88) 
0.545*** 
(6.02) 
0.456* 
(1.72) 
1.051* 
(1.83) 
0.620*** 
(4.35) 
ln[AL]  3.301*** 
(4.49) 
2.130*** 
(3.59) 
2.280* 
(1.89) 
-0.067 
(-0.21) 
0.272** 
(2.13) 
0.278*** 
(2.90) 
-0.325 
(-0.43) 
0.094 
(1.01) 
lnMS -0.271*** 
(-7.44) 
-0.281*** 
(-7.52) 
-0.234*** 
(-5.46) 
-0.300*** 
(-8.50) 
-0.036*** 
(-13.95) 
-0.031*** 
(-13.57) 
-0.044*** 
(-5.59) 
-0.001 
(-1.14) 
lnIM  0.038*** 
(2.84) 
0.020 
(1.32) 
0.049* 
(1.88) 
0.038*** 
(3.97) 
0.027** 
(2.87) 
0.029*** 
(3.92) 
0.008 
(0.54) 
0.025*** 
(6.27) 
Sargan chi2 15.34 
(0.286) 
16.46 
(0.225) 
8.83 
(0.116) 
22.15 
(0.139) 
16.83 
(0.207) 
15.00 
(0.307) 
8.12 
(0.150) 
19.66 
(0.236) 
AR(2) 0.954 0.942 0.182 0.656 0.717 0.481 0.772 0.111 
Number of observations  126 126 57 168 116 111 61 166 
 
Note. t-values are reported in parentheses.  
a
 We include institutions as a one-period-lagged index to control for the fact that institutional change might affect economic growth not immediately but only in the next 
period. In addition, lagged values of institutional indexes may help to further reduce the endogeneity problem. 
*p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. 
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Table 2.   
An extended analysis of short-term effects of economic institutions on growth for the revolutionary sample  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note.  t-values are reported in parentheses.            
a
 We do not calculate long-term institutional effects on economic growth for all economic institutions due to a large number of missing values for earlier periods found for 
some institutional indexes.  
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Corruption perceptions index(t-4)
 a
 
 
0.225** 
(2.26) 
    
Protection of property rights(t-4) 
 
 0.033 
(0.65) 
   
Protection of property rights  
Short-term effect (t) 
 
Quadratic effect 
   
-0.240*** 
(-3.56) 
0.285*** 
(3.62) 
 
0.022** 
(2.19) 
 
-0.007 
(-0.54) 
Corruption perceptions index (t)    -0.081 
(-1.18) 
-0.107 
(-1.35) 
Interaction  (Corruption and protection of property rights)     0.008** 
(2.32) 
lnYt-1 -0.377*** 
(-3.18) 
0.478* 
(1.79) 
-0.060 
 (-0.75) 
-0.247*** 
(-3.67) 
-0.239*** 
(-3.64) 
lnK 0.398 
(1.31) 
1.557*** 
(2.99) 
0.494*** 
(3.07) 
0.816*** 
(2.87) 
0.763** 
(2.37) 
ln[AL]  0.006 
(0.02) 
0.156 
(0.25) 
-0.175 
(-1.06) 
-0.227 
(-1.52) 
-0.196 
(-1.35) 
lnMS -0.029*** 
(-7.78) 
-0.054*** 
(-6.77) 
-0.026*** 
(-10.78) 
-0.028*** 
(-14.99) 
-0.028*** 
(-9.09) 
lnIM  0.052*** 
(4.96) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
0.033*** 
(5.81) 
0.045*** 
(8.85) 
0.046*** 
(7.16) 
Sargan chi2 8.72 
(0.464) 
9.07 
(0.106) 
15.80  
(0.395) 
15.48 
(0.403) 
15.18 
(0.439) 
AR(2) 0.861 0.140 0.469 0.296 0.305 
Number of observations  85 36 127 125 125 
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Table 3. 
 
The impact of political quality indexes on economic growth, by type of institutional formation 
 
Variable 
Evolutionary   
way of institutional formation 
   Revolutionary 
way of institutional formation 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Voice and accountability  
  
0.613** 
(2.41) 
    0.172 
(1.22) 
    
Political stability   
 
 -0.138 
(-0.27) 
    -0.054 
(-0.53) 
   
Government effectiveness    0.474 
(0.98) 
    0.485*** 
(2.85) 
  
Regulatory quality  
 
   0.011 
(0.02) 
    0.654*** 
(3.60) 
 
Control of (political) corruption  
 
    -0.323 
(-0.50) 
    0.666*** 
(3.05) 
lnYt-1 0.209*** 
(4.76) 
0.212*** 
(3.79) 
0.188*** 
(3.19) 
0.200*** 
(3.35) 
0.212*** 
(3.38) 
-0.262** 
(-2.51) 
-0.239* 
(-1.87) 
-0.298** 
(-2.45) 
-0.242 
(-1.31) 
-0.332** 
(-2.40) 
lnK 1.258** 
(2.55) 
1.139* 
(1.77) 
1.228** 
(2.14) 
1.190** 
(2.15) 
1.177** 
(2.19) 
0.269 
(1.24) 
0.123 
(0.63) 
0.199 
(1.04) 
0.262 
(1.35) 
0.209 
(0.93) 
ln[AL]  2.283*** 
(2.69) 
2.599*** 
(2.95) 
2.522*** 
(2.64) 
2.718*** 
(3.00) 
2.655*** 
(2.90) 
0.266 
(1.06) 
0.439* 
(1.84) 
0.169 
(0.71) 
0.551** 
(1.96) 
0.106 
(0.37) 
lnMS -0.303*** 
(-11.27) 
-0.284*** 
(-6.85) 
-0.285*** 
(-7.06) 
-0.286*** 
(-7.01) 
-0.284*** 
(-6.93) 
-0.015** 
(-2.54) 
-0.013* 
(-1.82) 
-0.013** 
(-2.05) 
-0.020*** 
(-3.69) 
-0.016*** 
(-2.77) 
lnIM  0.074*** 
(4.61) 
0.071*** 
(3.93) 
0.078*** 
(3.62) 
0.073*** 
(3.75) 
0.069*** 
(3.36) 
0.024*** 
(4.08) 
0.026*** 
(3.85) 
0.025*** 
(4.44) 
0.025*** 
(4.37) 
0.028*** 
(4.47) 
Sargan chi2 10.28 
(0.329) 
10.27 
(0.329) 
10.73 
(0.295) 
10.22 
(0.203) 
10.24 
(0.331) 
12.02 
(0.212) 
15.01 
(0.110) 
13.36 
(0.147) 
10.61 
(0.304) 
11.91 
(0.219) 
AR(2) 0.897 0.841 0.681 0.855 0.965 0.120 0.174 0.181 0.110 0.124 
Number of observations  89 89 89 89 89 124 124 124 124 124 
 
Note. t-values are reported in parentheses.  
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.  
 
PARAMETER HETEROGENEITY IN INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS ON GROWTH        38 
 
Table 4.  
The impact of political quality indexes on institutional indexes, by type of institutional formation 
Note. t-values are reported in parentheses. The political quality indexes have been included in the equations sequentially.  
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.  
Variable 
Evolutionary     
way of institutional formation 
  Revolutionary 
way of institutional formation 
Impartial 
courts 
equation 
Property  
rights 
equation 
Contract 
enforcement 
equation 
 Corruption  
perceptions 
equation 
Impartial 
courts 
equation 
Property  
rights equation 
Contract 
enforcement 
equation 
Corruption  
perceptions 
equation  
Voice and accountability  
  
1.119*** 
(4.31) 
1.719*** 
(7.45) 
-0.490 
(-0.51) 
0.162** 
(2.25) 
0.383 
(1.40) 
-0.392 
(-1.42) 
0.556** 
(1.99) 
-0.027 
(-0.15) 
Political stability   
 
-0.623*** 
(-3.24) 
-2.290*** 
(-5.58) 
-0.534 
(-1.29) 
-0.022 
(-0.27) 
-0.205** 
(-2.20) 
-1.907*** 
(-7.74) 
0.226 
(0.99) 
-0.120*** 
(-4.09) 
Government effectiveness  
 
0.312 
(1.24) 
-0.031 
(-0.08) 
0.011 
(0.03) 
0.003 
(0.02) 
0.466* 
(1.93) 
2.280*** 
(6.84) 
0.219 
(0.65) 
0.732*** 
(5.86) 
Regulatory quality  
 
0.083 
(0.32) 
-0.236 
(-0.65) 
0.040 
(0.15) 
-0.227 
(-1.56) 
0.810*** 
(3.54) 
2.585*** 
(7.06) 
0.476* 
(1.77) 
0.494*** 
(3.01) 
Control of (political) corruption  
 
-0.399 
(-1.02) 
-0.881 
(-1.59) 
-0.042 
(-0.12) 
-0.205 
(-1.62) 
0.976*** 
(9.39) 
2.755*** 
(8.96) 
-0.427 
(-0.78) 
0.554*** 
(7.96) 
INSTITUTE t-1 -0.139* 
(-1.89) 
0.111** 
(2.38) 
0.301** 
(2.13) 
0.380*** 
(3.51) 
0.209*** 
(5.28) 
0.406*** 
(9.60) 
0.152 
(1.19) 
0.467*** 
(4.15) 
URBANIZATION  -0.641*** 
(-7.76) 
0.181** 
(2.16) 
0.110 
(0.98) 
-0.140*** 
(-3.05) 
-0.435*** 
(-2.87) 
0.080 
(0.58) 
-0.393** 
(-2.12) 
0.007*** 
(3.81) 
SAVINGS  -0.005 
(-0.49) 
-0.117 
(-1.59) 
0.003 
(0.20) 
-0.010* 
(-1.93) 
-0.015*** 
(-4.08) 
-0.051 
(-0.26) 
-0.002 
(-0.02) 
0.012** 
(1.96) 
GOVS 
 
-0.075*** 
(-6.46) 
-0.102*** 
(-5.54) 
-0.004 
(-0.26) 
-0.005 
(-1.02) 
-0.021* 
(-1.90) 
-0.062*** 
(-4.08) 
-0.031* 
(-1.69) 
0.004 
(0.65)  
Sargan chi2 19.74 
(0.138) 
21.05 
(0.110) 
13.26 
(0.190) 
13.27 
(0.505) 
13.62 
(0.478) 
17.23 
(0.243) 
4.22 
(0.122) 
15.97 
(0.142) 
AR(2) 0.440 0.664 0.389 0.785 0.885 0.138 0.280 0.179 
Number of observations  116 116 53 116 78 77 36 93 
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Table 5.  
Associations between change in economic institutions, values, and economic structures  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Note. t-values are reported in parentheses.  
a 
These associations should be interpreted with some caution since the cause-effect mechanism can run in both directions. 
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.  
  
 
 
Dependent variables
a
 
 
Variable  Change in 
impartial courts 
index 
Change in 
property rights 
index 
Change in 
legal enforcement of 
contracts index  
Change in 
corruption 
perceptions index 
     
Institution1996 -0.252*** 
(-7.15) 
-0.408*** 
(-8.63) 
-0.014* 
(-1.93) 
-0.224*** 
(-3.70) 
Ethical behavior of firms 0.363*** 
(3.05) 
0.022 
(0.14) 
0.010 
(0.37) 
0.387** 
(2.32) 
Soundness of banks -0.013 
(-0.14) 
0.025 
(0.19) 
-0.028 
(-1.03) 
0.409*** 
(2.99) 
Financial market sophistication 0.038 
(0.53) 
0.176* 
(1.72) 
-0.031 
(-1.03) 
-0.074 
(-0.69) 
Production process sophistication    
 
0.057* 
(1.67) 
 
Adj. Rsq.  0.753 0.789 0.282 0.503 
Number of observations  21 21 21 23 
